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IS CULTURAL IMPOSIDON LESS OF AN ISSUE WTIH 
INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGIES? 
Ype H. Poortinga 
University of Tilburg, Netherlands & 
Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium 
An important reason for the development of indigenous psychologies 
is the alleged imposition of western cultural ideas and beliefs embedded 
in mainstream psychology. This contemporary psychology found in the 
affluent western countries can be considered as an indigenous psychology 
of which the relevance for other parts of the world should be questioned. 
However, the unconditional endorsement of the need for a plurality of 
indigenous psychologies carries crucial implications. Such a plurality as-
sumes, as a rule, that knowledge in psychology does not hold for the 
human species as a whole. Moreover, almost per definition cultural outsid-
ers are (more) wrong and cultural insiders (more) right on issues concern-
ing their own culture. The thesis of this chapter is that variations in knowl-
edge and insights associated with various indigenous perspectives can 
enrich psychology as a universal science of human behavior, but that 
insiders do not have a natural advantage when it comes to theoretical 
insights. 
Indigenous Psychologies and the Relativism-
Universalism Contrast 
To clarify the topic of discussion a distinction can be made between 
indigenization at three levels, namely (a) theory and conceptualization, 
Cb) operationalization, and (c) the topics and issues addressed by the 
profession of psychologists, both in research and in practice. 
To begin with the last point, archives such as PsycLit show that 
contemporary psychology is mainly engaged with concerns prevalent in 
western societies. Issues of illiteracy and poverty and how these can be 
addressed in intervention programs draw far less attention than, for ex-
ample, individual psychotherapy or the psychological concomitants of 
heart surgery. Berry, Poortinga, Segall, and Dasen (2002; see also Poortinga, 
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1999) speak about the ethnocentrism of psychology, including cross-cul-
tural psychology, and they see the selection of topics, dominated by the 
affluent part of the world, as the most serious expression of such ethnocen-
trism. Obviously, research and application directed at local problems and 
needs requires local contextual knowledge . Does this mean that psycho-
logical findings acquired elsewhere are largely irrelevant, or only that they 
need to be screened for local relevance? Even a tentative answer to this 
problem depends on one's theoretical position concerning the relationship 
between behavior and culture. 
The second level of ethnocentrism has to do with operationalization, 
i.e., the way domains of behavior and concepts are crystallized in assess-
ment instruments and separate items within such instruments. Psychologi-
cal processes and traits, however defined, can rarely be assessed without 
reference to actual behavior repertoire. In so far as this repertoire of be-
havior differs across cultures, common assessment instruments show 
inequivalent or incomparable results (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). The 
history of comparison of cognitive test scores as a basis for racial distinc-
tions issues a loud and clear warning. However, the fact that data can be 
inequivalent does not yet mean that all data are inequivalent. Moreover, 
as we shall see later, different levels of equivalence can be distinguished. 
The answer to the question whether or not equivalence is a realistic goal, 
again depends on one's views of the relationship between behavior and 
culture. 
The third level at which cultural imposition can take place is the level 
of theory and conceptualization. Typically, western theories and concepts 
are studied in cross-cultural psychology. These concepts have emerged in 
the socio-historical context of western societies and have been formalized 
in religious and philosophical thinking. Do these concepts apply else-
where, and vice versa, do concepts from other contexts have relevance in 
western settings? In other words, are local theories likely to be more valid 
or is it more meaningful to work towards universal theories of behavior? 
Answers to the questions raised so far depend to a large extent on 
one's (meta-) theoretical perspective. In contemporary cross-cultural psy-
chology the major distinction is between cultural relativism and psycho-
logical universalism (Berry et al., 2002). The latter acknowledges deep 
influences of cultural context on behavior, but also recognizes that psy-
chological functions and processes are shared by humans in all cultural 
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groups. This choice for primacy of the organism not only as a biological 
but also as a bio-psychological or bio-social entity implies that a search for 
what is psychologically universal can be productive despite all the cultural 
diversity in manifest behavior. In cultural relativism the primacy of the 
biological organism is not denied for basic processes like, for example, 
reflexes, but the emphasis is on typically human behavior for which a 
primacy of culture is postulated. Cultural practices are not explained in 
terms of common psychological principles, but rather seen as expressions 
of a unique culture and its historical roots. The literature on indigenous 
psychology tends to take the latter rather than the former perspective, 
either as an intermediate (Sinha, 1997; Enriquez, 1993) or as a definite 
(Kim & Berry, 1993; Shweder, 1990) position. 
In my view there are various theoretical difficulties with such a per-
spective that will be presented in the following in the form of three para-
doxes. 
1. Ethologists compare across species, and culturalists emphasize non-
comparability within the human species. 
2. Postulates of incomparability pre-empt empirical tests of incompara-
bility. 
3. Smaller cross-cultural differences are found for more general traits. 
Paradox 1. Ethologists Compare across Species, and Culturalists 
Emphasize Non-Comparability within the Human Species 
There are now numerous studies of chimpanzees and other great 
apes that suggest cultural variations in behavior patterns. For chimpanzees 
Whiten et al. (1999) could list 65 behaviors that appeared to be socially 
transmitted. Thirty-nine of these were customary or habitual at some ob-
servation sites while they had not been observed at other sites. These 
patterns were mainly concerned with sexual advances, grooming and the 
use of tools, and variations resembled those between human societies. 
Russon (2002) studied how orang-utans raised in captivity and later gradu-
ally released in their traditional habitat acquired patterns of tool use and 
preparation of certain foods for consumption from other orang-utans that 
they met. Russon freely uses terms such as "culture and cognition," "ap-
prenticeship," "enculturation" and a "life history perspective" for great 
apes. Rendell and Whitehead (2001) suggest that there is even fairly exten-
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sive evidence from field studies to the effect that cultural transmission can 
be found in whales and dolphins, using definitions of culture centering on 
social learning. 
While the general argument in ethology tends towards continuity and 
similarity across species and through phylogenetic history, cross-cultural 
psychologists with a relativist orientation lean towards essential differen-
tiation. When Shweder et al. (1998) make a distinction between mind and 
mentality, they go on to emphasize the latter, culture-specific, orientation 
on human behavior. Similarly, Valsiner (2000, p. 85) argues that "both 
persons and contexts are culturally constituted ... the life of humans as 
species differs dramatically from other biological species even when rudi-
ments of cultural organization of life can be found, as among higher 
primates." 
Thus, ethologists focus on the analysis of psychological functions; 
variations in behavior are seen to provide evidence of culture as a faculty 
or aptitude of a species, rather than evidence of psychological differences 
(in mentality or psyche) between various groups. Cultural psychologists 
tend to see variations in behavior as evidence of differences in psychologi-
cal functioning; the essence of human behavior derives from (culture-
specific) meaning and/or intention. 
It can be argued that genetic similarity across species and within 
the human species is pointing to culture as a biological faculty that defines 
constraints as well as affordances (or opportunities) for behavior variation 
within the human species (Poortinga & Soudijn, 2002). For two reasons 
this does not help much in the discussion about this paradox. First, the 
pathways from genetic information to manifest behavior remain largely 
uncharted, allowing authors freedom of interpretation about the extent to 
which there are constraints that would argue against relativism and to 
which extent variations in behavior-culture interactions point to affordances 
that would argue against a universalistic viewpoint. The second reason is 
that the boundaries between what is seen as shared/similar and what is 
seen as specific can change over time without much effect on basic posi-
tions. Thus, it is rather obvious that the strong version of relativism re-
flected by Shweder in 1990 has shifted considerably in later years (cf. Shweder 
et al., 1998). A similar shift can be observed when comparing a recent 
review of Miller (2002) with work of only a few years earlier (cf. Miller, 
1997). Even though it can be argued that strong relativism has become 
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somewhat marginalized under the influence of biological thinking in psy-
chology authors like those mentioned continue to distance themselves 
from a universalist perspective. Hence, this paradox has not come much 
closer to resolution. 
Paradox 2: Postulates of Incomparability Pre-Empt Empirical 
Tests of Incomparability 
The two (meta-) theoretical perspectives of relativism and universal-
ism have consequences for the cross-cultural analysis of the empirical 
validity of psychological concepts. There are numerous concepts that ac-
cording to the authors who published about them cannot be readily trans-
lated into English. Examples of such (non-western) indigenous concepts 
are the emotions of song (Lutz, 1988) and liget(Rosaldo, 1980) and person-
ality constructs like anasakti (Pande & Naidu , 1992), machismo (Diaz-
Guerrero, 1993), and philotimo (Triandis & Vassiliou, 1972). 
Let me take the latter as an example. According to Triandis and 
Vassiliou (1972, pp. 308-309) someone who is phi/otimous "behaves to-
wards members of his in-group the way they expect him to behave." They 
write: "A person who has this characteristic is polite, virtuous, reliable, 
proud, has a 'good soul,' behaves correctly, meets his obligations, does his 
duty, is truthful, generous, self-sacrificing, tactful, respectful, and grateful." 
When a large proportion of the Greeks report that they see themselves as 
phi/otimous there are two basic orientations in the interpretation of this 
finding. First, there is something to phi/otimo that the Greeks have and 
"we" do not have. Second, philotimo (philotimous behavior) can be ob-
served with us, it is just not explicit in our language or self-reports; for 
example, it is a particular blend of common human dispositions that has 
become salient in the Greek language and society probably for socio-
cultural-historical reasons. 
Can we do empirical research that brings us closer to a solution? It 
follows from the first paradox that theoretical arguments pro and con these 
two positions are not going to provide a definite answer. If we turn to 
empirical research, this would have to be comparative in one way or 
another, either using the same instniment or different instruments, but 
With some means of linking data obtained from non-Greek samples with 
those of Greek samples. Comparison requires some common standard 
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(Beny et al., 2002; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997) both at the conceptual 
level and at the level of measurement. There are three different opinions 
on the feasibility of such a standard; it tends to be either (i) denied, (ii) 
presented as a research question, or (iii) taken for granted. 
Although comparability, or equivalence, of concepts and instruments 
transferred from one culture to another tends to be denied by relativistic 
researchers, it is not uncommon to find that they are actually making 
comparisons. At the very minimum these amount to the claim that some-
thing in another target culture is essentially different from the state of 
affairs found in one's own culture ( what is the basis of such claims if all 
valid comparison is ruled out?). In addition, one finds explanations in the 
way local concepts are culture-specific (how can such explanations be 
given if comparison is ruled out?). For example, in the very same book 
where Shweder 0990) hackled the tradition of culture-comparative psy-
chology, he coauthored a study conducted in India and the USA, interpret-
ing "the similarities and differences in the moral understandings of chil-
dren and adults in the two cultures" (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990, 
p. 131). 
Virtually all researchers in cross-cultural psychology accept that cross-
cultural differences in scores on tests and questionnaires cannot be inter-
preted at face value, because of the likelihood of cultural impositions and 
bias being introduced with the transfer of methods and instruments across 
cultures. However, in sources such as the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psy-
chology and the International Journal of Psychology one can find numer-
ous comparisons where the scores on some instrument administered in 
different cultural samples are being compared without clear evidence to 
the effect that the scores indeed can serve as a valid common standard for 
such comparisons. In other words, equivalence is assumed but not dem-
onstrated. In my view many of the criticisms of culturalist researchers on 
culture-comparative research are justified because of the discrepancies 
between what is preached and what is practiced. 
The remaining possibility is that equivalence of concepts and me-
thods is neither taken for granted nor rejected summarily. If I am not 
mistaken, this option has been gaining ground in recent years. The need 
for establishing equivalence as a condition for valid comparison has be-
come more widely recognized, as testified by literature on this topic, like 
the well-known text by Van de Vijver & Leung 0997). If one compares the 
Culrurnl imposition and indigenous psychologies 193 
various levels of equivalence and the array of approaches distinguished by 
these authors with the rather simplistic notions in the 1960s and 1970s 
about absence and presence of (item) bias as a kind of dichotomy, consid-
erable progress has been made. Unfortunately, there is a price to pay for 
more sophisticated research; design and analysis are becoming more com-
plex, and the size of data sets has to be increased. 
The empirical search for common standards does not only pertain to 
measurement, but also to the comparability of concepts. An issue on 
which fairly extensive research has been conducted in recent years, is that 
of the cross-cultural validity of personality trait dimensions, such as the 
dimensions ("Big Five") postulated by the Five Factor Model. The most 
commonly used instrument is the NEO-Pl-R (Costa & Mccrae, 1992). Simi-
larities in factor structures across a range of countries have been the basis 
of claims for universality (e.g., McCrae, 2000; McCrae & Allik, 2002). How-
ever, when local personality inventories were administered with the NEO-
PI-R to Chinese respondents an additional factor emerged, labeled Inter-
personal Relatedness. Such a finding can be seen as evidence of culture-
specificity in personality make-up. One can also go a step fu1ther and raise 
the question what happens if instruments constructed in China are admin-
istered in the USA and elsewhere (cf. Cheung & Leung, 1998). The inter-
personal relatedness factor has been replicated in a multiethnic sample in 
Hawaii, tentatively suggesting that this aspect of personality is not only 
present in Chinese cultures (Cheung et al., 2001). Similarly, Stewart et al. 
(2002) found that the Chinese notion of guan, which refers to the social, 
ization and training of children, in part appeared to function in a similar , 
way in the USA and Pakistan as in Hong Kong. 
All in all, I am more optimistic about the scope for resolution of this 
second paradox than of the first one. Undoubtedly, the evidence will not 
always be straightfo1ward and easy to interpret, but in so far as researchers 
can reach consensus that methods are tentative standards that should be 
examined for equivalence, there is a way fo1ward. To which extent philotimo 
is better seen as a culture-specific ingredient of personality make-up among 
the Greeks and to which extent it is as a language-specific reference to a 
more widely shared trait or cluster of traits is one of the questions that can 
then be pursued further. 
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Paradox 3: Smaller Cross-Cultural Differences Are Found 
for More General Traits 
For cultures geographically not too close together one can easily find 
psychological variables (e.g., specific skills, attitudes, beliefs) for which 
there is hardly any overlap in distribution, while individuals within each 
culture behave in a similar way; the within-culture variance is small com-
pared to the between-<:ulture variance. With measures that pertain to broader 
aspects of behavior, such as cognitive abilities, moral principles and per-
sonality traits, we find quite the reverse; between-culture variance is much 
smaller than within-culture variance (e.g., Poortinga & Van Hemert, 2001). 
Thus, if we examine broader and more inclusive concepts cross-cultural 
differences become less prominent. Among others Cole (e.g., Scribner & 
Cole, 1981; Cole, 1996) has argued forcefully for the context-specificity of 
relationships between culture and behavior. 
This third paradox implies that in a psychological sense differences 
between cultures apparently are not coherent across broader domains of 
behavior and psychological functioning. This makes it doubtful whether 
culture does have system qualities at the psychological level. At the same 
time, it is difficult to find conclusive evidence. If two cultures differ simul-
taneously in respect of two variables these differences may hang together 
somehow, but causal relationships and coincidence often have a similar 
appearance; it is difficult to differentiate between coincidental and system-
atic relationships. Perhaps the most convincing arguments are to be found 
in the history of cross-cultural research. Even a superficial analysis shows 
that in new areas of research initially broad and inclusive characterizations 
tend to be postulated, leading to sweeping conclusions about more gen-
eral differences between cultural groups. Subsequently, such differences 
are redressed to much smaller proportions. For example, in perception 
research earlier notions about greater sensory acuity of traditional peoples, 
or general differences in perceptual modalities (with African groups tend-
ing towards the auditory and Western groups tending towards the visual 
modality), have long been abandoned. What have remained are quite 
specific differences, for example in susceptibility for certain visual illu-
sions, and the skill to perceive depth in certain pictures (e.g., Deregowski, 
1980). In cognition different modes of thinking were postulated, notably 
on the basis of literacy and schooling. None of these "great divide theo-
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ries" (Segall, Dasen, Beny, & Poortinga, 1999) has been upheld. In person-
ality research there has been a shift from the characterization of entire 
populations in a single "modal" trait to the above mentioned search of 
universal trait dimensions. Similar examples can be found in other do-
mains of behavior (Poortinga, in press). 
A resolution of this third paradox is possible if one conceives of a 
culture as a behavior repertoire consisting of a large set of conventions or 
practices (cf. Poortinga, Van de Vijver, Joe, & Van de Koppel, 1987). Such 
conventions and cultural rules are directly observable, or require only 
small inferential steps, as they tend to be limited to quite situation specific 
concepts. According to Girndt (2000) conventions are not limited to overt 
actions, they include beliefs, ways to handle problems (e.g., believing that 
stone houses are better than wooden houses), and explanations of rules 
and concepts (e.g., looking at someone while talking shows honesty and 
openness, versus not looking someone in the eye is a matter of respect). 
From such a perspective it is also conceivable that there can be local 
cultural variations in the conceptualization of psychological functions and 
processes. 
Conclusion 
Historically indigenous psychology movements can be seen as an 
appropriate reaction against the tendency among western researchers to 
see their psychology as an accomplished science and field of application 
to which "others" can only add details. Such a perspective in my view 
amounts to a serious overestimation of the state of development of psy-
chology, even if one assumes that systematic accumulation of knowledge 
on human behavior is possible. However, if this critical view has merit, it 
should equally apply to other indigenous psychologies. 
The resolution of paradoxes as presented in this chapter points to the 
need for an understanding of cross-cultural invariance as well as variations 
in behavior. Such understanding can constrain the range of plausible and 
valid answers to the lead question of this chapter, namely whether cultural 
imposition is less of an issue with indigenous psychologies. These more 
definite answers can be best pursued with a common research agenda of 
all indigenous psychologies, including the one called "mainstream." Power 
differences that continue to exist between the "North" and the "South" in 
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terms of scope for research, financial resources and access to international 
publication outlets (Adair, Coelho, & Luna, 2001) form the main impedi-
ment to such a common agenda. 
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